ပြောင်းလဲစွေ့လျင် ကြင်နားလည် မြူနာ မိုးဗျူ မူနီးကြမ်း အကြောင်း အမှတ်ကြီး ဟူ၍ အကျဉ်းဖော်ပြ ခေါ်တယ် သူ၏ အကြောင်းအရာကို သူ၏ အကြောင်းအရာဖြင့် အခြေခံပေး များစွာ အဆိုးအတွက် အကြောင်းအရာများ သို့မဟုတ် အကြောင်းအရာများ ပေးချင်သည်။

ဗျာ သို့မဟုတ်ဗျာ နှင့် အတူတူ အမျိုးသားများ သို့မဟုတ် အမျိုးသားများ၏ အကြောင်းအရာများ သို့မဟုတ် အကြောင်းအရာများ သို့မဟုတ် အကြောင်းအရာများ သို့မဟုတ် အကြောင်းအရာများ ပေးချင်သည်။

“စားသောက်ရောင်းမှု ဆိုင်ရာ မိုးဗျူ မူနီးကြမ်း အကြောင်း အမှတ်ကြီး”? မှတ်တမ်းတင်ပါ။

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*The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 18 November 1886, p. 5, col. 3*
 The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 9 December 1886, p. 3, col. 1, from The Indian Union

 The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 28 October, 1886, p. 3, col. 1

 The Allahabad Paper
The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 4 November 1886, p. 4, col. 1, မြစ်များစွာ သို့ ဗား မြင်နေသည်။
မြန်မာစာအရာရှိများ၊ ရေးအောင်မြင်ခြင်းမှာ သားဝန်များ စိုးရိမ်မှု များစွာ ကော်မာလေးများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ သို့သော် ရေးအောင်မြင်ခြင်းမှာ သဘောတူးခြင်းများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ သဘောတူးခြင်းမှာ သေချာစွာ ထောက်ပံ့ပါသည်။

ပထမစီးပွားရေး ငါးမျိုးစာကြောင်းနှင့် ကြိုးစားခြင်းများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ သူ့ကြိုးစားခြင်းမှာ သဘောတူးခြင်းများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ သဘောတူးခြင်းမှာ သေချာစွာ ထောက်ပံ့ပါသည်။

*The Statesman, 9 December 1886, p. 2, col. 4–5*  ကွက်ကွက်များ ၆ မျိုး
စားသော အခေါ် အရှည်ပြုမှုအကြောင်း အချိန်တွင် ဆိုင်ရာ မိုးမဲ့နေဖို့ မော်ရေး အသုံးပြုပါသည်။ သူများ အထွေထွေအားဖြင့် ပြန်လာမှုကြောင်းသော ပြည်သူများ ရှိရပါသည်။ အားကန်မှာ ပြန်လာမှုကြောင်း သော ပြည်သူများ ရှိရပါသည်။ အထွေထွေအားဖြင့် ပြန်လာမှုကြောင်းသော ပြည်သူများ ရှိရပါသည်။ အသုံးပြုပါသည်။
THE AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA.
JULY 8, 1886. p. 4, col. 2—5
THE MUDDLE IN BURMAH.

Poor Sir Charles Bernard has been entrusted with the task of pacifying Burmah without being furnished with the funds necessary for the purpose. He has an army without a sufficient number of officers to control it, and he has to administer the affairs of a country without a sufficient number of civil officers. When Lord Dufferin invaded Burmah he had no idea that the enterprise would cost so much money. The Government has been ruined by the Burman war. It is in a pitiable condition as regards funds, and cannot help Sir Charles with them. Sir Charles Bernard must shift for himself, and the inevitable consequence is that instead of the country being pacified, it is going to ruin on all sides.

The Government of India has, at the same time, the task of stopping public clamour, and this is being done sometimes by the display of the loot obtained at the Palace of Theebaw, sometimes by an attempt to utilize the machinery which Theebaw had imported from Europe to work iron mines, for the Burrakpur works, and sometimes by holding out hopes of the great undeveloped resources of the country, of its fine forests, its ruby mines, and its earth oils &c. &c. The present condition of Upper Burmah is like that of Bengal when it was under Clive and Hastings. The Company wanted money, only money, and the Governors of Bengal had to find it by squeezing it out of the people. The consequence was the great famine which caused one-third of the people of the country to perish.

Indeed, the Burmah business is gradually assuming gigantic proportions. Only six months ago Lord Dufferin boasted that the least costly and bloodless of all modern wars was the present Burmah expedition. So did Lord Lytton boast after the deposition of Shere Ali and the capture of Cabul. And what happened then in Afghanistan is what is happening now in Burmah. It is really a popular rising upon a most extensive scale. The overthrow of Theebaw cost about £350,000, but in the pacification of the country, we are slipping to an inconceivable height. The conquerors have been in possession of Upper Burmah since November; but each successive month has intensified hostility to their rule and deepened the revolutionary movement which is designed to overthrow them—but, of course, will not.

Lord Dufferin will now see that if he is not a "quack" politician, he is at least no far-seeing statesman. The class of optimist politicians who swarmed around him and advised him to enter into the war are now looking foolish, and the worst anticipations of the pessimists are likely to be realized. It would appear that the Government had plunged into the business with not only a light heart, but with their eyes shut.

The only incident which they relied which has not betrayed them is the fact of the superiority of our arms over those of the enemy. It was this which made them confident. They never enquired into the fighting capabilities of the enemy, or took to calculate the probable amount of opposition they would receive. But they saw they had Snidars and mountain guns which the Burmese had not, and this was sufficient for them to invade a difficult and jungly country of warriors where blood-
shedding is the pastime of the people, and robbery their trade. Yet the disasters of Isandula and the Soudan should have taught our rulers that arms are no match for numbers. The New York Tribune thus remarks upon the Burmese war:—

The intelligence of the repulse of a British military expedition by the Kachyen tribe is, however, still more serious. As the account, of course, come from English sources it must be regarded as certain that its significance is not less than appears from the despatch, while it may very easily be more. As stated it looks like a pretty bad defeat, the expedition having apparently narrowly escaped one of those overwhelming rushes with which so many wild tribes have repeatedly of late years nearly succeeded in overcoming the resources of modern science and discipline. As in South Africa, as in the Soudan, the savages, by their force and weight of numbers and desperate contempt of death, disabled the battery of the British and drove them back.

A fresh expedition against the Ka—Chins has also proved equally abortive. The Pioneer's special correspondent writes thus bitterly on the subject:—

Whether Major Cooke's case was as strong as it should have been no one knows; but that he has ensured us a very troublous future with the Ka—Chins of all tribes, and for then once utterly destroyed the prestige of the British arms above the Shwe Lee river nobody can deny. The result of several communications with Bhamo was the retreat of the force, the military authorities not caring to run counter to the urgent representations of the civil officer. A satisfactory proof of the severe nature of the punishment inflicted on the Ka—Chins was shown in the retreat. They pursued and fired into our column almost the whole way to Mansee, crowding in every now and then so much on the flanks of our baggage train that the rear guard, in which the greater part of the force had been placed, had to turn and make rushes at them periodically, the Ka—Chins meanwhile keeping up derisive shouts and discharging their gun into our column. The result of this last gallant attempt to uphold the honour of England on the North—Eastern Frontier of Burmah have been two transport animals killed, and a man very slightly wounded; while the Ka—Chins are credited with a loss of 10 killed, most probably apocryphal.

Fortunately for us, the Burmans are not capable of any organized combination. Fortunately for us, the French or the Chinese have not supplied them with arms of precision. If they had been better armed, the war would have been altogether a serious affair. As it is, it taxes the utmost resources of the Government to keep the army supplied with reinforcements.

Honestly speaking, there is nothing in the present occupation of Upper Burmah which can be contemplated with pleasure or satisfaction. The Hindoos and Mussalmans can have possibly no feeling whatever in the matter. The Burmans were neither their friends nor foes; and they can only view the question from a moral point of view. From there they see that the Government is doing a very wicked thing in spreading desolation over an inoffensive country. But there is one point which pithes them sorely. They feel that all these massacres of men and the burnings of villages are being carried on with their money.

The inhabitants of British Burmah must feel quite differently. They are said to have been living happily under the benign rule of the British. But yet they and the Upper Burmans belong to the same nation. Is it reasonable to suppose that the spectators of the massacre of their own countrymen and co—religionists could give them pleasure? It cannot be believed by anybody that the subjugation of their own nation could please the Burmese community of Lower Burmah, except perhaps by
those who at one time thought that the Upper Burmans would receive the English with open arms,

Then, we have the English community in India. Englishmen boast that England is the mother of free nations. They boast likewise that a sense of justice and fair play is what never leaves an Englishman. Now fancy what the Government is doing in Burmah. You can call the Burmans rebels and dacoits, their attempts to free themselves from the yoke sought to be imposed upon them as raids and insurrections, but the fact is, the Burmans are nobly fighting for the independence of their country. The Burmese leaders may have the look of a cut-throat, they may have a hang-dog appearance, but nevertheless they are patriots fighting tooth and nail for the preservation of their independence.

This being so, the conduct of the Burmans ought to elicit admiration from every right-minded Englishman. What are the rulers doing instead? They are mowing them down with sharpnell and grapes! But they are doing more. The peculiar style in which the execution of “rebels” is being carried on in the country cannot but cover the fair fame of British rule with shame and disgrace. Then, the rulers have been burning villages, and, in the process of suppressing “dacoits,” managing to turn the loyal villagers against them. Says the British Daily Mail:—

A dacoit outrage at some place being reported, a force is sent to punish the criminals. When it arrives the criminals are gone, but on the principle of doing something firm and impressive the village is burned down, and the villagers are left to ponder the question whether between dacoits and the troops of the Empress Queen life is worth living. We went into Upper Burmah to carry to its people the inestimable blessing of justice and security to life and property, but for some reason or other these are the very things which the Chief Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, and whoever else is in authority under them, seem to have left behind.

And the outcome of all these is, as we have seen an uprising of the whole people against the new Government, and a determination on their part to resist it to the uttermost. Their hatred against their new masters is daily increasing, and they show no signs of submission. We know it is best for them to submit, but they prefer to fight. So we must either fight with them and make them detest us still more, or come back. To fight is to spend money and blood, and murder the Burmese and lay their country in waste, and perhaps ultimately to abandon it as a profitless territory. We can certainly retire and leave the Burmans to settle the matter amongst themselves, but this is a view which honorable Englishmen do not like. They think it would be humiliating &c. &c., though it is in no way humiliating, according to them, to mow down defenceless men with sharpnell and grapes, and make India pay for the cost. Never was perhaps a more profitless, meaningless, and to us, disastrous war undertaken by the British Government.
The \textit{Indian Witness} speaking, we presume from the personal knowledge of the writer, draws a painful picture of the sufferings of the troops in Burmah, which are very faintly understood he says, by the public of Calcutta:--

The brief and unauthenticated telegrams about sickness have almost concealed the fact that long marches, exposure, and insufficient food have made an incredible number of men victims to the ravages of cholera, dysentery, and fever. Many of these have lived to be carried miserably back to headquarters down the river to Rangoon, then on board a steamer, and here to Calcutta, to languish for weeks or months in the military hospital where a long row of bed, with patients from Burmah has been a daily sight, and the death rate has been melancholy.

It would be idle to conceal that the ‘annexation’ we have made, whether reluctantly or otherwise, is likely to cost us very dear. A correspondent of the \textit{Pioneer}, writing under date of 6th instant from Katha, expresses a fear that the date fixed for the arrival of the reinforcements, and the resumption of active operations is too late, and he adds:--“To all who doubt that drastic measures are necessary to crush the rebellion, and disperse all the hostile combinations at once, I say take a trip up the river from Mandalay to Bhamo and back again, and your eyes and ears will convince you that, if we do not take the initiative, the rebel Prince and the Woonho Tsawbwa will soon be masters of the situation. The Tsawbwa is, both from his position, his wealth, and the extent of his dominions, the most powerful enemy we have in Upper Burmah at the present time. The other pretenders, viz., the Choungwa Princes and Moung Hmat, are of secondary importance to the Tsawbwa.”

The conviction grows upon ourselves that, instead of attempting to establish our direct rule throughout the vast and sparsely peopled territory we have ‘annexed,’ it would be greatly wiser to place the territory under a prince of the Alongpura family, and simply control his relations with foreign powers. That the ‘annexation’ can ever be anything but a troublesome and most costly acquisition, must be becoming clear to most of us. The correspondent we have already quoted, after describing the hospitals at Katha as being already filled writes:--

The health of the Nayakoung outpost is reported to be deplorable, seventeen men having been struck down with a severe type of fever in one day. The officer commanding Lieutenant Ravenshaw, and both native officers of the 26th Punjab Infantry, have also been ill. Of late the type of malarial fever prevalent in Katha and its outpost appears to have taken a change, two new and marked characteristics being observable; first, delirium; and second, a swelling of the limbs, particularly the feet. I learn that when this latter phase comes on nothing but immediate change of air seems to do any good. Even with that, a large number of men so affected died either before or immediately after arrival in India.”

As to the military position, the same correspondent writes:--
The whole of the country inland is reported in a state of great disquietude; very large bodies of men have lately been assembling, and great activity has been shown by the rebel Chiefs of Mawlu, Monhyin, Manlong, and Woontho. Some 4,000 men besides those previously reported as having collected at Shwe Gau Gyee on the Meza river, have been sent from Woontho who are commanded by several celebrated Bohs and the Mogoung Woon in person. All the passes in the Minwoon range of hills have been occupied by them, and now a perfect cordon of hostile posts has been established from Kyundoung in the south to Monhyin in the north, thus enclosing the loyal Burmese officials of Shwe Ashe Chaung, Myadoung, Manle, Kaungton, and Ngakayine in a semi-circle, in which also are included our posts of Katha and Nayakoung: they are thus cut off from all communication except by river, or to the east in the Momeit district.

Doubts are entertained of the loyalty of the Manle Woon in whose district the outpost of Nayakoung is situated; however, no fears for the safety of that post are entertained, as it is sufficiently strong to beat off any number of inferiorly armed Burmese. In view, however, of the sickness of the garrison, and the necessity for keeping the command of the Petsoot pass, a reinforcement of 30 rifles. 25th Madras Infantry, was sent out to Nayakoung yesterday. But for the establishment of the Nayakoung outpost all the officials named above, resident in the Mieza valley (with the exception of the Myadoung Woon who is on the Irrawaddy), would have been compelled to desert their district are this, and take refuge in Katha, thus leaving a large extent of country and a loyal population at the mercy of the Woontho forces and their bands of Mawlu and Monhyin. Native reports state that about the 10th current, a preconcerted attack will be made by about 4,000 men on Nayakoung, and afterwards Katha, while another force of 3,000 men will annihilate all the loyal officials in the Mieza valley; a portion of the Woontho forces will then march south, and capture the Myadoung, Kyundoung, Pale, and Nagasin districts, and will join the rebel prince Mong Hmat in an attack upon the garrison of Shwebo and Yeu. It would seem very necessary to reinforce the garrison of Katha largely as a safeguard against possible attack, and also so as to take advantage of the very commencement of the cold weather to carry the war into the enemy’s country, by attacking and dispersing their combinations.

I learn that a hostile reply has been received to the Chief Commissioner’s letter of conciliation to the Woontho Tsawbwa, and there is now no doubt whatever that an expedition against the Woontho will have to be carried out this cold weather. This will be a formidable operation, and will require a large force, as the Tsawbwa is a very powerful Chief. The population of Woontho, it is said, numbers nearly 80,000 souls, and he can mobilise 10,000 fighting men. Woontho, the capital, has a strong timber stockade round it, and is further defended by several cannon and jingals. Another stronghold in the north called Manloung is said to be formidable, the Tsawbwa is reported to have called out all his fighting men, and is casting more cannon and jingals.

KYANYAT and MALE, September 7.

It is very evident that organised attempts to attack the English posts will be made in the course of the current month. Nearly all the Burmese inhabitants, except of the villages of the river bank who live mainly by trading, appear to have enrolled themselves under the standards of the Woontho Tsawbwa or Prince Mong Hmat. On arrival last night at Kyanyat, we learned that all the townsmen were in a great state of terror owing to the proximity of a very large body of dacoits from Pale, who had planted Prince Mong Hmat’s standard on the river bank, opposite the town, and posted up a proclamation to the effect that the Prince had decided to
destroy all the villages and inhabitants of the banks of the Irrawaddy, as they had submitted to the English, and become traitors to the Burmese cause. A few nights since a very daring murder and dacoity occurred in a suburb of Kyant just outside the stockade. A man who had sent a petition about a case to the Deputy Commissioner was simply cut to pieces with das, and all his property taken. His reference to the British authorities for protection is believed to have been the cause of his death.

At Male, where the steamer arrived this morning, the town is completely dominated by a large force of dacoits who are said to be within less than 10 miles distance, while Prince Moung Hmat is reported to have re-established his head quarters at Yuatha, within 30 miles of Male, the place from which his forces were driven away last July by Lieutenant King with a force from Shwebo. I learn that the Deputy Commissioner of Katha, to whose district Male has recently been added, promised, in response to a petition for a military post to protect the town from the dacoits and Prince’s followers, to represent the urgent necessity of establishing one. Male, which is a large, wealthy and populous town, has always been subject to the inroads of dacoits, notably in the ex-King’s time, when portions of the town were looted on an average two or three times a year.

THE AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA.
OCTOBER 28, 1886. p. 5, col. 2-3

EDITORIAL NOTES.

The following remarkable letter, dated from Pondicherry, has been addressed to some of our daily contemporaries by the Burman-Prince Myn-Goony, who signs himself the “Eldest Prince of Burmah”:—

Sir,—In the recent debate in Parliament on Burmah affairs, some of the honorable members enquired “Why the Government of Burmah was not made over to a native Prince. The Secretary of State for India answered that Lord Dufferin proceeded to Mandalay with that view, and although there were 70 or 80 branches of the royal descendants, yet not one was found fit and capable to govern the country, and hence annexation was declared.”

As Burmah has now been proclaimed a part of H. M’s dominions, and the British Government may govern it itself, or do what it likes with it, I have nothing to grumble about that; but to bring me also under the category of the other illegitimate and unfit princes and descendants, of which there are so many, is very injurious to me, my position, and my cause. I am the eldest, the legitimate, and the rightful prince, which the accompanying book will plainly show and prove, and I have done nothing whatever to give offence to the British Government, except escaping from its captivity, and taking protection under the French Government, which step was taken by me only to secure my personal freedom; and I have frequently, while residing in French territory, corresponded with the British Government, towards whom I have personally cherished only friendly feelings.
I sent you the accompanying pamphlet in the hope of meeting your favour, and should any opportunity offer itself, your valuable paper will be my advocate, and do justice to my cause.

According to all accounts Prince Myn-Goon is the legitimate heir and representative of the late King Min-Doon, who died in 1878, when Prince Theebaw is said to have usurped the throne as his successor. Now that Prince Theebaw has been deposed, and the legitimate successor of the old King is within reach, we do not see why the Government should not wash its hands of a difficult responsibility. By restoring Native rule in Burmah it could perhaps do more to “pacify” the country than ever its 30,000 bayonets are likely to accomplish. Such a step would not only disburden it of the onus of administering a difficult territory in face of the united opposition of its people, but also relieve it of the sin of making poverty-stricken India pay for what her people regard to be a crime.

THE AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA.
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1886.
p. 3, col. 3
REINSTATEMENT OF THEEBAW.

There is no doubt now that a talk has been going through the inner circles of the Government concerning the reinstatement of Theebaw. Indeed, the talk has passed beyond the “confidential” coteries, and is being made the subject of more or less general comment. Very likely the reinstatement would have long since been an accomplished fact if the chief difficulty in the way of taking the necessary steps had not been a silly amour propre. This peculiar feeling has kept the hands of our Government from many a rightful act, and has in every instance proved a delusion and a snare.

It was not very long ago that Afganistan occupied the same kind and degree of the attention of the Indian people and Government that Burma is doing today. Then, as now, a war had been undertaken into a strange and difficult territory without either necessity on one side or provocation from the other. Then, as now, we had found ourselves in the midst of a people who wanted neither us nor the benefits we might have had to confer. Then as now, we had discovered before long that the cost entailed by the enterprise would be more than the country could bear. And then, as now, an insane self-love stood in our way of leaving a place which both justice and interest advised us to shun. So we persisted in our blind egotism until an avenging fate convinced us of the recklessness of our proceedings. We were soon shewn that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but that there is a justness of things which is outraged by license, and every oppression of the weak by the strong is to be met with a terrible doom. The savage Afghans burnt our garrisons, massacred our men, and left us no way to flee. And the sinful aggression was given up after it had cost us lives untold and wealth beyond our means.
No one believed then, and no one believes now, that the British Government finally decided upon evacuating Afghanistan because its resources fell short, or because it found the task of keeping the Afghans in check impossible. Everybody knew and knows that our military resources were fully equal to chastising the Afghans ten times over, and of keeping the country in subjection to boot. But everybody knows as well that the game was not worth the candle, and that it would have been repeating a folly twice over to undertake avenging the consequences of the first. Afghanistan was left to itself because it profited us not the least to meddle in its affairs, and the Government at once secured the sympathy and esteem of those who had been its avowed opponents.

Similar has been the history and similar the effect of many unjust wars which the English people have begun in mistake, and kept up in the face of odds, under the delusion of otherwise losing their prestige. In each case the war had to be given up when the initial error was discovered, and in every case this was done with no loss of prestige, but with gain in every other respect. The world is familiar with the histories of the English wars in Zululand, in the Transvaal, and in the Soudan. We all know how each of these wars was undertaken without cause and given up with loss. But no sane person believes that English muskets were no match for Zulu spears, or that the pluck of the Boer was superior to English pertinacity, or that the Soudanese could have held their own if they had not convinced the English people of the folly of continuing a profligate warfare. The ultimate giving-up of each of these wars by the English people secured them only the esteem of all thinking men, and increased their prestige in the eyes of those who understand the courage that lies in the retracing of an unjust step.

In the case of Burmah, specially, to be afraid that the giving up of the war there would be attended with loss of prestige to the British Government is a very great error. No one in India or out of it for a moment believes that the almost unarmed Burmese can hold out indefinitely against British bayonets and repeating guns. No sane person has ever been known to hold that the fight between our forces and the Burmese is by any means a fight between equals or that our prestige would not be enhanced by refusing any longer to break lances with one who is obviously our inferior. While the whole body of the people of India are ready at any moment to declare, that the confession by Government of the error it has committed in the annexation of Burmah would not only raise it in their esteem, but enwrap it to their hearts.

Of course, there are two very strong motives which are influencing the majority of Englishmen to persist in the ruinous undertaking. Many of them really believe that an English occupation would do ultimate good to Burma in the same way that they think it has done to India. Others look for a field of wealth and material prosperity in the hitherto undeveloped resources of the country. But the march of events has already proved both these hopes to be mere delusions, at any rate to all persons amenable to reason. It is clear by this time that in order to civilize the rude, pugnacious and restless people of Upper Burmah, and to bring their hills and jungles under the influence of modern culture, it would require an outlay of men and money which India is totally incompetent to furnish. It is also clear that before any work of civilization could be begun in the country, it would have to be partly depopulated. Nor are the difficulties of the situation by any means lessened by the fact that the Burmese are averse as much to receiving Englishmen and their civilization as they are to parting with what they regard as their own.

We therefore think it very opportune at this moment to assure the Government with emphasis what we have always considered our duty to tell it, that, in
disposing of the Burma difficulty, there is no way open to it more honorable or so easy as the one dictated by justice. Let it but give back to the people of Burma their independence and to the rightful heir his throne, and no one whose word is worth anything would think of saying that the British Government did this either from fear of consequences or from want of power to accomplish what it had undertaken. For ourselves, we can lay our right hand upon our heart and declare from the bottom of it that, if we at all understand the Indian people, England’s prestige would not be diminished one jot in their estimation by such a step; rather her character for justice and generosity would be enhanced every bit. Not a true organ of popular thought in the whole country but will echo our sentiment; and for the sake of the peace of two countries we beg all our Indian contemporaries to take hold of this opportunity and give the Government the necessary advice and assurance of their good faith.

Napoleon, in 1815, after he had lost his empire and army, resigned himself, by preference above all other nations, to the hands of the English, whose chivalry and fair-mindedness would be his best protectors against an adverse fate. Thobeeb, in 1885, said not a word of protest, far less made a show of resistance, when the enemy marched into his capital, but trusted himself to the same English people. The England of 1815 could exhort such confidence in her character from one who had been her greatest foe. We earnestly entreat Englishmen of the present day not to forget the glorious traditions of justice and chivalry which made England the large-hearted country she once was.

THE AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA.
NOVEMBER 4, 1886. P. 4, COL. 1

A WORD IN TIME.

The state of affairs in Burma is more discouraging than ever. Both Press and people have ceased tiring over the accounts of disaster which have been flowing in upon high tide for months and months past. Extraordinary mishaps do not any more make us wonder why things are so bad, nor do tales of horror excite much pity. Something like a conviction has been gaining ground that there is a fatality about this Burma business which bodes no good. The public mind has grown callous towards what to all appearances cannot be helped, and the public conscience stands dull and palsied before the inevitable. Noticing sad incidents and being sorry over them has become a mere matter of form, and the talk of “conciliation” is a meaningless iteration which very few people have any hopes of seeing realized.

The Pioneer has a leader upon “Another Burma difficulty,” full of gloomy expectations. Even this champion of the forward policy does not fail to see that the carrying on of operations to bring an end to the “intolerable state of things in Upper Burma” is beset with difficulties of no mean order. Reading between the lines it is easy to see that nothing but its committal to the fatal policy which will
hand Lord Dufferin’s name to bad fame could make it keep a good face in the midst of a forecast of difficulties which would shake the strongest nerves. The *Pioneer* concludes its article with a passage which cannot but betray to the ordinary reader a forced attempt to take a calm view of affairs by no means calculated to cheer up the heart:—

No one will be disposed to deny that the difficulties of the situation are great; but it is the business of English administrators in India to meet difficulties of the kind that beset us in Burma, and to meet them with credit; and if a man fails of this, all that can be said is that he does not come up to the standard of his predecessors, or to what is expected of himself. The Lower Province has an organised administration, which has been given full warning and ample time to set its house in order. If disturbances again appear to disquiet the country, to divert the troops from the proper objects of the campaign, or to counteract its effects and retard the settlement, such a state of things will deserve to be looked upon not as a misfortune, but as a scandal.

The facts, in brief, are these—and we will let our contemporary tell the story as much as possible in its own words:—

It should not be forgotten that there is an uncomfortable prospect of disturbances breaking out again in the Lower Province, as soon as the face of Government is turned the other way (towards Upper Burmah.) We do not so soon require to be reminded how serious the state of things there was only a few months ago; how a Deputy Commissioner was shot by dacoits at Bassein, while the Eastern Districts were in anarchy; how at Rangoon itself there were rumours of an intended attack; how telegraph wires were cut and railways threatened; how the dacoits became bolder and the police more timid, until people might be excused for believing that we were about to be confronted with a national rising. Nor does it need to be shown what a check the repetition of such disorders would prove upon the forthcoming campaign. In the present state of things, however, there seems to be every ground for apprehension.

The truth is, the annexation of Upper Burmah has left a large element in the population without either homes or occupation. They have now no resort except to fly to the mountains and consign themselves to the tender mercies of the hill tribes. As perhaps, this is not exactly to their taste, they prefer to keep moving on, as they are pressed, from district to district, and from the Upper Province to the Lower, and vice versa. They have been branded as "dacoits," but, in good sooth, considering the circumstances into which they have been suddenly thrown by no fault of their own, the means of keeping alive that they have adopted is as much legitimate as that followed by the best among us. It is certainly more lawful than that, for instance, of the Burmah Trading Company, whose avarice was at the bottom of all the blood that has been spilled, the property that has been ruined, and the disasters that have been caused in the Province of Burmah. As to the organized resistance which the "dacoits" have systematically offered to the establishment of a new "order," their very organization, determination, and numbers have convinced even the most unreasonable annexationist that their "dacoity" is nothing more nor less than rebellion, a brave and laudable fight for freedom enjoyed till but yesterday, and threatened with extinction for ever. Nor are their noble efforts altogether attended with ill success. The garrisons through large tracts of country command only as much ground as they can see over, and the Commissioner himself, newly arrived from the Punjab, is said to have declared that the whole district of the Upper Sittang, the country about Nyingyan and Yemethin had been "annexed by the rebels." The country is still virtually in the hands of a "dacoit" called the Bhoda
Yaza and his followers. Successive telegrams up to the latest hour only confirm the apprehension that the situation has not improved a bit. "Agriculture has been long suspended, and the stocks of food for the most part have been seized by the dacoits. According to the best information a severe scarcity prevails, which would be a serious matter if it only affected the prospects of the proposed railway—a project which is all important for the settlement of the country."

But this by no means fills up the list of difficulties. The Allahabad paper goes on to say:—

It follows from what has been said above that there is a *prima facie* case for expecting a large overflow of unsettled and destitute, and therefore dangerous, people into the country south of Toungtoo and the Eastern Districts generally, more especially Shwegyien; and the more rigorous the campaign above, the more likely is their number to increase. And local accounts already speak of the presence of lawless and suspected characters in great numbers.

To crown all, the state of the Burmah police is terribly defective, at a time when the utmost vigilance and activity are needed to prevent the forming of centres of disturbances and rebellion. "It is not only that the material of the force is confessedly bad; that is a fault which cannot be mended in a day under the most energetic regime. But the organization and management of the Department would appear to be deplorably inefficient."

The champion of annexation, evidently disheartened at the prospect, and unable to find any clue out of the quagmire in which its favoured policy has landed the State, ends by pouring the vials of its wrath upon the devoted head of the "incompetent" police, as if the inefficiency of the police were the cause of the disordered state of things, rather than what it truly is, an unavoidable consequence of the extraordinary difficulties that have to be coped with. Another innocent head upon which our contemporary would like to lay the blame of the evil fruits of the guilt to which it itself is a party, is the central authority of the Province:—

We do not indeed suppose that the Chief of the Province is at all responsible personally for the state of things complained of, but the same want of a strong will and purpose at headquarters make itself evident at this as other points of the administration. And this brings us to the left and main necessity of Burma just now, a firm central authority to control and direct. If such existed, we should not hear, in the Lower Province at any rate, of a dislocated administration, of Deputy Commissioners being kings in their own territories, and of dacoits therefore living securely in one district when their refuge is perfectly well known in the next for want of co-operation between the neighbouring monarchs. Such things read too plainly as the signs of weakness at headquarters.

Now, while the *Pioneer* has been unable to disburden its conscience and relieve its mind after a long review of the situation, its prospects and remedies, we shall rest satisfied by saying but one word—a word in time, which is better than volumes when it is too late. Prevention, they say, is better than cure, and an ordinary precaution is wiser than the sages after thought. What we would say to the Government and its supporters in the fatal Burmah policy is simply this: Before the contemplated operations for "pacification" have commenced, it is not yet too late to mend your position. Be just, restore Native rule in Burmah, and depart from the Province; and Peace will attend both where you go and where you leave. And if there is a God in heaven, He would bless both the Burmese and yourselves. For in such a case as yours Justice, like Mercy, is doubly blessed—it blesses him who gives as well as him who receives.
It is stupid to suppose that a police, however well organized, could keep in order a whole population up in arms, who seem to be afraid of neither privations nor death. It is a silly hope that an alien central authority, however strong, could inspire the awe or enforce the loyalty which tradition attached to a house of hereditary National Kings. The days when India was first occupied are past, and the circumstances of Burmah are entirely different. The Burmese are far from being as passive and tractable a race as the "mild" Hindus, and the very smallness of their country is a help to internal co-operation which was not possible in the Hindoostan of 1757. Besides, the general spread of information and communication has nowadays lessened the difference between the more and the less advanced of communities in the matter of self-defence, while liberty is as much prized by the latter as by the former, if indeed not more. The savage Soudanese proved more than a match for the enlightened Britishers, and the Burmese bid fair to do the same.

Let the Government therefore beware, before it is too late, lest it should undertake the impossible. It has a thousand and one tasks before it as imperative as the so-called "pacification" of Burmah, but certainly more legitimate and more important in their bearings. Foremost among these is the pacification of the people of India, upon the fulfilment of whose new wants depends the very existence of the British Empire in the East. Let the Government take care that in the pursuit of an insensate policy it does not usher in the beginning of its own end. Now when dangers threaten it from without and within, let it not persist in bringing upon itself discomfitures which, beginning in the far East, may drive it on, no one can tell how far. Let it not in a fit of wrong headedness venture, like the proverbial fool, to rush where angels would not dare to tread.

THE STATESMAN
9 DECEMBER 1886. p. 2, col. 4—5

A CORRESPONDENT of the Allahabad paper, in reviewing the events of the last year in Burmah, illustrates very clearly and in detail, the peculiar difficulty of settling a territory, in which there are no centres of population.

The temporary pacification effected last December and January by purely military movements, was superficial in the extreme. It extended to wherever our small flying columns, poorly equipped with land transport and heavily handicapped by jungle, morass, and paddy-fields, could strike rapidly and effectively. It would have been best represented by circles drawn round each military post, varying in radius according to the number of troops at each central point. These circles would scarcely ever have touched one another thus, between Nyingyan and Mandalay on the east there was a great gap; the Chindwin Valley was practically untouched; between Shwebo and distant Bhamo there was no link.

The writer is simply picturing the facts, as we have ourselves portrayed them, from the first. "An expedition by river through a country of vast extent, half,
covered with jungle and practically without internal communications, must always have this drawback, namely, that its immediate effect is of necessity localised to the banks of the stream, and that unless the people themselves agree to accept the new rulers, the real conquest must begin, after the first, great objective point has been seized. The capture of Mandalay had undoubtedly the effect for the moment, of stunning such of the Burman leaders as would, if time had been allowed them, have opposed a stubborn resistance to our advance, as in our previous Burman wars. But when they began to realize that our strength was for the moment, on the river only, and not on dry land, they rallied from the first shock, and Upper Burmah was soon overrun with armed bands, which terrorised the peaceful inhabitants, and effectively checked any spread of our authority by those gentler measures which we, as conquerors, desired to employ. Then began that guerrilla warfare where our soldiers are at the greatest disadvantage, by reason of the deadly climate, and the natural obstacles opposed to their progress from point to point."

The soldiery have done all, that the utmost bravery and devotion could do. Nor is there the slightest blame, so far as we can see, to be attached to Sir CHARLES BERNARD and the civil administration. The task both of the soldier and the civilian, has been hitherto an impossible one, and will remain impossible if the Burman people should unhappily prove to be irreconcilable. It is the possibility of this proving to be the case, that long since led us to suggest the wisdom of restoring native rule in the Upper Province. For how a country like this is to be administered, in the face of a hostile population, so sparse and with no centres of administration, seems to ourselves insoluble. Martial law affords no more hope, under such conditions, than the civil magistrate. Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, we are told, "will be no party to any arrangement which, after April next will throw upon the military the task of hunting down every petty dacoit leader, and punishing every band of robbers who may loot a village in remote districts. India can spare a reasonable number of troops to garrison the chief towns, and to overawe ambitious pretenders; but she cannot and will not submit to keeping over 30,000 men in the valley of the Irrawaddy, half of whom would be doing police work."