ဒီဇာတ်လမ်းသစ်တစ်ခုကို ဖော်ပြကြည့်ရန် ခင်ကြီးတွေ့ဆုံပါရာ၊ အကြောင်းပြောပါသည်။ ချစ်သူများ သေချာလိုသည်။ အချိန်မှစပြောခဲ့သည်။

ဒီဇာတ်လမ်းသစ်တစ်ခုကို ဖော်ပြကြည့်ရန် ခင်ကြီးတွေ့ဆုံပါရာ၊ အကြောင်းပြောပါသည်။ ချစ်သူများ သေချာလိုသည်။

Donald Mackenzie Wallace
(m) အိုးဝမ်ပစ္စည်းများကို ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ပေးခြင်းကို ပါ သို့မဟုတ် သိကြသည်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခြင်း

(n) စိုးရိမ်များကို ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ပေးခြင်းကို မှားကြောင်းအရာကို တိုက်တွန်းခြင်း

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* Viceregal Life, 194
* Further Correspondence, C. 4887, No. 25, p. 19
* Scheduled District
Memorial of the Ministers of the Hluttaw which they were desirious of presenting to the Viceroy but which His Exe declined to receive *
ယောက်တာကို သုံးစွဲထားသော အစားအစား ရေးသားထားသော စာရင်းကို ဖယ်ရှားထားပါမည်။ သို့သော် ပြည်သူများ၏ ရက်စွဲမှုကို မဖော်ပြထားပါ။ ကျယ်ပြန်၍ စာရင်းကို ဖယ်ရှားထားပါ။

ယောက်တာကို သုံးစွဲထားသော စာရင်းကို ဖယ်ရှားထားပါ။ သို့သော် ပြည်သူများ၏ ရက်စွဲမှုကို မဖော်ပြထားပါ။ ကျယ်ပြန်၍ စာရင်းကို ဖယ်ရှားထားပါ။
Address by Hludaw (not allowed to be presented E.B.S. 1886)

To


May it please Your Excellency,

We, the ex-Ministers of State of the late Burmese Government, are in duty bound to submit the following circumstances for Your Excellency's favorable consideration.

2. Whilst the British and Burmese armies were at war on the Irrawaddy, a special council was convened, His Majesty presiding, for the express purpose of soliciting an armistice.

His Majesty in Council, taking into consideration the future welfare and prosperity of the Kingdom, decided on despatching Envoys to the Commander of the British Forces, and in pursuance of that Council sent a letter in charge of the Envoys, stating for a suspension of arms, and saying that all the demands of the British Government in their late ultimatum would be conceded.

At this time the British troops had gained possession of several towns on the Irrawaddy, along one half of its course within Burmese territory, but had not yet conquered the Provinces of Toungoo and Taungdwingyi, where separate Burmese forces were in position.

Besides these the country along the course of the Upper Irrawaddy, and the Chindwin River as well as other remote districts, towns, and villages, had not succumbed to British arms.

Solicitous, however, of preserving intact the Dynasty and country, the Burmese sued for peace, and thought that by so doing they would best maintain their national honor and the blessings of their religion.

3. General Prendergast, the Commander of the British Forces, replied as follows to our application for an armistice:

"In accordance with the instructions received from the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, it is quite out of my power to accept any offer or proposals which would affect the movement of the troops under my command, on Mardalay. No armistice can therefore be granted, but if King Thaobew agrees to surrender himself, his army, and his capital to British arms and if the European residents at Mardalay are all found uninjured in person and property, General Prendergast promises to spare the King's life and to respect his family. He also agrees not to take further military action against Mardalay beyond occupying it with a British force, and stipulates that the matters in dispute between the two countries, shall be negotiated on such terms as may be dictated by the British Government."

On receipt of this reply we were led to believe, that if we surrendered our arms, and agreed to such other immediate demands as would be dictated, we should at least have had an opportunity of entering into fresh negotiations.
We certainly expected that as soon as a treaty had been concluded, our kingdom would have remained to us without loss of prestige to our national honor or our religion.

5. In accordance with the promise held out in the correspondence between the two Governments, a cessation of hostilities took place before war was concluded. Our King, country and arms were surrendered. The clergy and people hoped that in the interests of their country, religion and national honor, the British Government, in obedience to the customs and usages of all great nations, would have fulfilled their obligations.

Regarding the restoration of a sovereign of royal blood, and the re-establishment of a kingdom, all that the Burmese want is a king who shall be bound down by the British Government to observe law, and conform to the rules of constitutional Government.

If such an arrangement is made, the British Government will have the satisfaction of knowing that it has accomplished a measure which is most ardently desired by the people.

6. The vast British Empire, which is under the Government of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen Empress, the Viceroy and Governor General of India and other Governors, is acknowledged to be the greatest of all countries in the world. The laws and constitution of the English nation are sound, firm and exact; The English People are highly civilized. They are strictly faithful and straightforward in keeping their word and fulfilling promises. Tolerant and kind in regard to the rights, privileges and customs of other nations.

The Burmese being well aware of the magnanimity of the great English nation, surrendered themselves and their army to General Pendergast, and relied on the promise contained in his letter, without fighting to the last with all their might.

The ex-Ministers look forward with confidence to the time when their hopes and the hopes of the clergy and people will be realized.

True translation
E.B. Sladen.
Colonel,
The February 1886.
Chief Political Officer.

My dear Sladen (15 Feb. 1886) Monday evening

H.E. the Viceroy will be glad

(1) if Oo Meah can call on the P.S. in order to wait on H. E. at 12 noon tomorrow.
(2) to receive a visit from the Thathanabaing at 3 P.M. tomorrow. Will you kindly arrange. It would be well that you should accompany the Thathanabaing.

I am
Yours sincerely
C. Bernard.
TELEGRAM from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, Mandalay, February 13th 1886.

I have now seen all the persons whom it is possible to consult on Burmese question. Situation seems to be as follows:- Thaebaw's weak and incompetent administration has been stimulating during the last few years spread of dacoity all over country. Dacoits themselves were in communication with the more powerful ministers, who in turn leaned upon them for support. Rapacity and extravagance of the Court has also occasioned great discontent among the people. On this account no one seems to regret its disappearance, although evidence on this point is limited and somewhat conflicting. Great mass of the people are indifferent to future form of Government provided only it is sufficiently strong to protect them from gang robberies. But I suspect there is a good deal of sentimental reverence for Royal blood, and any Aungmyaung prince could gather around him a certain following. Ministers and Council of State would naturally prefer a king, provided we undertook to restrain him from abusing his authority, but these personages do not constitute a class or represent any general interest.

After great deal of consideration, my opinion is that the country is so disorganised, Council of Ministers so discredited and unimportant, and likelihood of our finding suitable candidate for the throne so unpromising, that the best course will be to assume at once and without further delay direct administration of the country. In the opinion of Bernard and of Sladen no Prince whom we might put upon the throne would be able to maintain his authority with any prospect of success against the numerous rivals who would arise up to oppose him; nor without our assistance would he make any very considerable impression upon the dacoits. Our responsibilities, therefore, would remain almost as great as ever, whilst our hands would be tied by the intrigues, jealousies, and procrastinations of a ruler who, in true Burmese fashion, would prove extremely unlikely to listen to reason. His Court expenses would also prove a considerable burden.

Myagoon Prince might perhaps hold his own by killing off his rivals, but he would probably fall into the hands of French adventurers and concessionaires who would be constantly giving us trouble. Nyoyung Oke Prince, Bernard tells me, is disobedient to orders and otherwise unpromising. The only alternative offering chance of success would be placing on the throne of some child, but this would be tying ourselves down for the future without curtailing our obligations or reaping any present advantage. I do not therefore recommend this course. We may have a little trouble for some time with dacoits and hill tribes, but from all that I can learn neither former nor latter are in the least formidable, being of an institution of both arms and ammunition. We could also secure Chinese border better than a Burmese Prince could.

Though Burmese war was unpopular with the native press in India through fear of taxation, I do not think our feudatories consider that our Burmese policy in any way endangers their own status.

Foregoing is the best opinion I can offer. It is quite unprejudiced, for my mind was disposed to accept the idea of converting Upper Burma into a protected State, had it been practicable. Though not a rich country like Lower Burma, its revenues are capable of considerable development. In a previous telegram I have set forth net cost of the present war for current financial year at from 30 to 35 lacs. Bernard calculates that during next year, 1886-87, revenues of the country will come within two or three lacs of the cost of the administration, including extra military expenditure, and it may fairly be expected, at no distance date, to show a surplus.

* Burmah, No. 3 (1886) Further Correspondence, C. 4887, No. 19, p. 16
If Her Majesty’s Government are disposed to coincide in the general views above submitted, which from the nature of the case had to be founded on complete data, it would be most desirable that I should announce fact at once before leaving Mandalay. Until all uncertainty is removed as to our intentions, we cannot expect native officials cordially to assist. I would therefore beg for earliest possible reply. I would then forward, for your approval, details of the administration scheme to be applied.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, February 16th, 1886.

Burmah. - Her Majesty’s Government have carefully considered your telegram of the 13th; I have now to acquaint you that, looking to the communication made to both Houses of Parliament in Her Majesty’s gracious speech as to the permanent incorporation of the kingdom of Ava with Her Empire, and the announcement made by your Excellency under instructions from Her Majesty’s late Government, and to your statement that you cannot recommend that Upper Burmah should be converted into a protected State, they have determined to adopt the course you advise, and to sanction the measure of assuming the direct administration of the country. You are authorized to proceed accordingly.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY’S FAREWELL ADDRESS
TO THE MINISTERS OF THE HLUTDAW, THURSDAY,
THE 18TH FEBRUARY 1886

* Burmah, No. 3 (1886) Further Corresp
MANDALAY:
The 18th February 1886.
WHY LORD DUFFERIN ANNEXED BURMAH.

Lord Dufferin settled the matter while he was at Mardalay last February, and wrote a minute, giving reasons why the annexation of Burmah, pure and simple, was the only way left to the Government to solve the Burmah difficulty. His Excellency marshals his arguments with great skill, but yet one cannot help wondering whether his arguments preceded his conclusion, or followed it. There is no doubt of it that the idea of taking away the liberty of an innocent nation was very abhorrent to the feelings of the good-natured Viceroy, and he did his best to avoid the odium of having done a very unjustifiable act. It is also quite possible that Lord Dufferin was over-puished by an unconscious desire of being the means of adding a new big country to the Empire.

In the minute, as we said, Lord Dufferin tries to prove that the annexation was the only remedy open to him, for the settlement of the Burman question. The way His Excellency adop s, to prove his position, is very objectionable. However, for in the same way, any pet theory can be proved and established. He mentions several rival theories, and disposes of them by pointing out their defects. But has the one he rejects, that is of annexation, no defect. Alas! subsequent events prove that the policy he described has proved perhaps more disastrous in its effects than the fancied horrors His Excellency feared from the adoption of the other rival policies.

His Excellency said, that, besides annexation, there were three or four ways of disposing of Burmah. One was to treat it like Afghanistan. The other was to give Upper Burmah a status similar to that of many Native States in India. There was still another suggestion which occurred to Lord Dufferin. It was to raise a mirror under the charge of British officials. But none of these suggestions recommended themselves to the good sense of Lord Dufferin and he enumerates his objections to all the rival policies. For instance he says:-

The maintenance by artificial means of its independence on the great Line of communication between our Burmese possessions and China was evidently a contrivance of more than doubtful utility. It would certainly prove an obstacle to free commercial intercourse, and its weakness might tempt the Government of Pekin to assert over it in a serious manner, those shadowy, and, as I believe, unfounded claims to suzerainty which the China Ambassador has recently put forward.

Subsequent events however show that, in spite of the annexation, the Chinese did put "the shadowy and unfounded claims to suzerainty," and got them.

Again:-

The very principle of protection, even in its most attenuated form, implies responsibilities out of proportion to our means of discharging them, and goes very far towards placing it in the power of the ruler we patronize to drag us into a war against our will by provoking his neighbours into aggressions, which whether justified or not, it might become necessary for us to resist.
But has annexation released our Government of its responsibilities, or has it increased them? As for a protected Prince dragging us into his wars, Afghanistan has not been able to do it these fifty years. Besides, the Government might have kept the foreign policy of the country in its own hand. This of course would have required the stationing of a British Contingent in that country. This, however, according to Lord Dufferin, was not possible for he says, "the country is not rich enough to support a British auxiliary Contingent". But my Lord, India could have been made to pay for it. Perhaps the Government felt that it would have been very unjustifiable and a mean act to make India pay for a Contingent in Burmah!

On the whole, summarizes Lord Dufferin:-

A puppet king of the Burmese type would prove a very expensive, troublesome, and contumacious fiction.

But has not the annexation of Burmah by the British proved also "a very expensive, troublesome, and contumacious fiction"?

Lord Dufferin next undertakes to dispose of the objections against annexation. The one objection of annexing Burmah was the susceptibility of the native Princes in India. This objection Lord Dufferin disposes of in the following manner:-

It has not unnaturally been suggested that the deposition of Theebaw and the absorption of his territories may raise uneasy feelings in the minds of our Indian feudatories. This is matter as to which I have made very careful inquiry, and I am quite convinced that the objection is unsubstantial. The Indian princes take but little interest in our proceedings in Burmah. They are not linked by either political or religious sympathy with the Burmese dynasty, whose sole connection with India in past ages was that of a hostile and aggressive power. They recognise clearly that Theebaw's position was essentially distinct from their own, and that their relations to the British Government stand upon a perfectly different footing. If the rapid subjugation and summary punishment of the Burmese King has had any effect whatever upon their minds, I should anticipate its serving to convince them that hostile or dubious intrigues with foreign powers are not likely to be tolerated by the British Government, and can only bring ruin upon those who engage in them.

The speedy conquest of Burmah no doubt impressed the Princes of India with the irresistible powers of the British Government. And this impression would have remained intact if the country, after its speedy conquest, had been left in the hands of a Burmese Prince. But the Protracted struggle maintained by the Burmese, and the ineffectual efforts of the Government with its shots and sharpnells, its highly finished arms, and its disciplined battalions, to subdue them, though unarmed, disorganized, and without leaders, are calculated to damage the impression at first created very seriously. So the Government must admit that the annexation has not enhanced, but lowered its prestige.

The other objection which Lord Dufferin found against the policy of annexation is contained in the following sentence:-

Annexation no doubt imposes upon us serious obligations and responsibilities, and is for a time certain to involve a great increase of anxiety, and possibly considerable expenditure.

Lord Dufferin has no doubt now come to see that he made a great mistake in underrating the above objections.
It is however useless to continue the discussion further. The one thing that has pained us to see is that the minute takes no notice of the moral aspect of the question. The Viceroy talked of British interests, Chinese claims, and all that. But no serious notice was taken of the fact that Lord Dufferin who was going to take away the liberty of a nation which it was enjoying from time immemorial by a dash of the pen. Every Englishman knows what it is to lose national freedom, and Lord Dufferin was going to deprive a people of its liberty. What offence had the Burman people given that their country should be devastated, and their men put to the sword? If it is robbery to take away life for gain, ours have been a huge robbery in Burmah. If Theebaw gave offence, he might have been punished and the country left to the Burmese, as was done in the case of Abyssinia and Afghanistan, and in the latter country, more than once. The deposition of Theebaw would have kept his successor in awful dread of British power to repeat the offence alleged to have been committed by the former.

And did it never occur to Lord Dufferin that he had been entrusted by Heaven to rule India in the interests of its people? His first duty certainly was to take care of the interests of the people under his charge. But did he not utterly forget this great fact when securing territories for the British Empire? Many people tell us that Lord Dufferin is a high-minded man, with too philanthropical tendencies to make a good statesman of the modern age. But was it an act of high-mindedness to fasten upon India the costs of this imperial affair? He is the only protector of poor India. Lord Dufferin seems to have forgotten all these when penning his minute. It was the consideration of British interests which alone guided His Excellency in arriving at the determination of annexing Burmah. It is idle to conceal that Lord Dufferin was persuaded to betray a trust, and this Burmah affair will always remain an indelible spot upon his glorious career.
SUMMARY

Lord Dufferin’s visit to Mandalay, 1886.

Ma Kyan

The British forces occupied Mandalay and deposed King Thibaw on Sunday the 29th November 1885. The proclamation of 1 January 1886 declared the province to be an integral part of Her Majesty’s dominions. But up till that time the kind of administration to be adopted in Upper Burma could not be arrived at. There were alternatives. Whether Upper Burma was to be transformed into a Buffer State, a Protected State or a Semi-Protected State, or a Regency were contemplated. All these arrangements necessitated the putting of a native prince on the throne of Upper Burma. The people were quite confident that a prince appointed by the British would succeed Thibaw. But the various Chambers of Commerce strongly advocated outright annexation. It is said that Lord Dufferin visited Mandalay with an idea of discussing the affairs of Upper Burma.

Their Excellencies the Viceroy and Lady Dufferin, and Sir Frederick Roberts, with their respective staffs, arrived Rangoon on 7 February 1886. The party arrived at Mandalay on board the Mindan on 12 February 1886: A reception hall was erected opposite the landing-stage. At one end of the hall two thrones each with a white canopy hung above, were placed side by side. On the right were seats for the military officers and the ex-Burmese ministers, on the left for the civil officers and the local community. After their excellencies were seated on the thrones and the 31 guns fired, addresses were presented first by the British and foreign communities in Mandalay and secondly by the Burmese merchants. The Mohamedan community headed by Mulla Jsmail also presented an address later.

His excellency declined to receive the two addresses presented by the ministers of the Hluttaw. The London Times of 19 February 1886 reported that the Burmese ministers showed their defiance and presented no address and extended no welcome to the Viceroy. We were taken in by that piece of information until very recently when we found the two addresses among the Sladen Papers. The addresses are in Burmese and bear the remarks, signed by Sladen, that His Excellency declined to receive them. One was a formal address of welcome to their Excellencies while the other embodied political obligations. The latter was signed by 18 ministers of the Hluttaw. It stated that it was the ardent desire of the people and of the clergy that their country would remain to them without loss of prestige to the national honour and their religion. General Prendergast’s reply dated S.S. Dooovoon, 26 November 1885, was quoted as to have promised an opportunity of entering into fresh negotiations on surrendering the arms and complying with other demands as would be dictated by the British Government. It further stated that in accordance with the promise thus held out, the people were quite confident that the British, strictly faithful and straightforward in keeping their word and fulfilling promises, would fulfill their obligations and that the people were eagerly looking forward to the time when their hopes would be realised. The addresses failed to please His Excellency and were not allowed to be presented.

His Excellency the Viceroy and party drove in procession to the palace. The whole three miles was lined with troops. There were two triumphal arches erected and Venetian masts marked the route. But it is said that only a comparatively small number of Burmese came out to greet the Viceregal party.
SUMMARY

The Viceroyal party remained in Mandalay for a week. Their Excellencies had a
good time visiting places, enjoying the Burmese drama of Rama, and meeting some
notables including the Thathanabaing.

On the second day of his arrival at Mandalay the Viceroy telegraphed to the
Secretary of State for India that "...the country was so disorganised. Council of Ministers
so discredited and uninfluential, and the likelihood of our finding suitable
candidate for the throne so unpromising, that the best course will be to assume at once
and without further delay direct administration of the country..." The measure was
sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government. The great expectations for the rule of a native
prince, appointed by the British, were crushed. The Hluttaw was abolished and Upper
Burma, incorporated with the British India, became a Scheduled District.

In his Minute dated the 17 February 1886, Lord Dufferin gave reasons why
annexation pure and simple, and the direct administration of the province by the British
Officers, was adopted by him. He precluded all other alternatives as highly objectionable
and not practicable; and that it would prove "a very expensive, troublesome, and con-
tumacious friction." He was quite sanguine that the course he adopted alone offered
the best prospect of securing peace and prosperity of Upper Burma and the British
Imperial and commercial interests. But it is rather doubtful whether the arguments
preceded the conclusion or followed it. Though Lord Dufferin stated that his deci-
sion was quite unprejudiced, consciously or unconsciously, his mind seemed to be
already plagued by the various Chambers of Commerce, the advocates of annexation,
before he visited Mandalay. It is to be assumed that to adopt such a measure of down-
right annexation His Excellency could easily be spared the trouble of coming down to
Mandalay. Lord Dufferin's Upper Burma policy was not without any opposition. Ques-
tions were asked in parliament why the administration of Upper Burma was not made
over to a native prince. Some of the Indian papers were also against his "direct admi-
nistration". They pointed out that the restoration of a native rule in Burma would do
more to "pacific" the country than the 30000 bayonets of the British. But the fate of
Upper Burma had already been sealed by a stroke of Dufferin's pen. No amount of
objections could undo it.

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