Contents
Executive Summary........................................................................ 5
What is the cost of Australia’s refugee policy in the Pacific?............................................................. 5
Will funds for Nauru be taken from other AusAID programs in the Pacific?....................................... 5
Why place refugees in countries that have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention?.................... 6
When will refugees leave the camps?............................................................................................... 6
Why export the policy of mandatory detention?................................................................................. 6
Has the refugee policy damaged Australia’s standing in the islands?............................................... 6
Why was there no regional co-ordination?........................................................................................ 7
What can be done?........................................................................................................................... 7
PART ONE........................................................................................... 8
Detention of asylum seekers in the Pacific.......................................................... 8
Australian government policy................................................................................................................... 8
a. Nauru....................................................................................................................................... 9
b. Papua New Guinea................................................................................................................. 10
c. Aotearoa/New Zealand........................................................................................................... 11
PART TWO......................................................................................... 12
Impact on Pacific development priorities.......................................................... 12
Total AusAID flows to Nauru 1990 – 2001....................................................................................... 13
PART THREE..................................................................................... 14
Issues arising from Australian program of detention in the Pacific.................. 14
a. Humanitarian impact on asylum seekers................................................................................ 14
b. Placement of asylum seekers in countries that are not party to 1951 Refugee Convention... 14
c. Resettlement of people to third countries after gaining refugee status.................................. 15
d. Introduction of mandatory detention programs into Pacific..................................................... 16
e. Refugees and internally displaced people in the Pacific......................................................... 17
f. Political fallout damages Australia’s image............................................................................. 18
APPENDIX ONE................................................................................. 20
Approaches to other Pacific countries............................................................... 20
Timor Lorosa’e................................................................................................................................ 20
Fiji 20
Kiribati............................................................................................................................................. 20
Palau 21
Tuvalu............................................................................................................................................. 21
APPENDIX TWO................................................................................. 22
Regional opposition to Australian policy on asylum seekers in the Pacific..... 22
Vanuatu Prime Minister................................................................................................................... 22
Forum Secretariat........................................................................................................................... 22
Fiji political, church and NGO leaders............................................................................................. 22
Nauru.............................................................................................................................................. 23
Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister sacked................................................................................... 24
Pacific Conference of Churches and Catholic Bishops Conference................................................ 24
Private sector.................................................................................................................................. 24
ENDNOTES........................................................................................ 25
156 George Street, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065
Executive
Summary
At the
beginning of the Tampa crisis in
August 2001, the Australian government approached a number of neighbouring
countries in the Pacific region to establish offshore detention centres – the
so-called “Pacific Solution”.
Aotearoa/New
Zealand, Nauru and Papua New Guinea agreed to take the Tampa refugees and others who arrived in Australian waters in
subsequent weeks, and to establish detention camps to hold the asylum seekers
while their applications for refugee status were processed. Other island
countries including East Timor, Fiji, Palau and Kiribati were also approached
to take asylum seekers, but have not done so.
There are
over 1,550 people currently held in detention centres in the Pacific who were
seeking refuge in Australia (1,118 asylum seekers are in detention on Nauru and
a further 446 on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea as at 30 January 2002). A
further 130 people have been declared as refugees, and have obtained residency
in Aotearoa/New Zealand.
The costs
of establishing and maintaining camps in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, and
processing applications for refugee status are met by Australia. Application
processing is being conducted by Australian officials in Papua New Guinea and
by Australian officials and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR) in Nauru.
Independent
visitors to the camp in Nauru have noted the harsh physical conditions, and the
trauma and uncertainty faced by the asylum seekers – conditions that have
sparked protests, riots and acts of self-harm in detention camps in Australia.
What is the cost of Australia’s refugee policy in the Pacific?
The exact cost of sending asylum seekers to the Pacific has
not been fully revealed, though media reports state that the Cabinet has been
told it will cost up to $500 million dollars[1]
to send asylum seekers to other Pacific nations.
Official government figures estimate the cost of setting up and running the detention centres in the Pacific at $96 million in 2001-02 ($72 million for the camps in Nauru, and $24 million for the detention centre in Papua New Guinea). The Royal Australian Navy has spent further millions on transporting the asylum seekers, and there are numerous other costs.
Nauru has been pledged a further $30 million for taking the asylum seekers which is being spent on a range of development programs and Papua New Guinea another $1 million. Some of these programs cannot be sustained (e.g. purchase of fuel and payment of hospital bills) and others (e.g. tertiary scholarships) will require funding beyond this year.
In the
Australian aid budget for 2001-2, Nauru was scheduled to receive just $3.4
million through the Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID). Therefore the pledge
of $30 million to Nauru is a major shift in policy for the Australian
government – the amount is greater than all AusAID funds provided to Nauru
between 1993-2001. It is also more than 18 per cent of the total AusAID budget
for the Pacific Islands (excluding Papua New Guinea), which is budgeted at
$164.6 million in 2001-02.
Will funds for Nauru be taken from other AusAID programs in the Pacific?
The financial
inducements offered to Nauru have distorted Australian development assistance
priorities in the South Pacific, which are supposed to focus on poverty
alleviation and governance programs.
In its
Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook Statement 2001-2002, the Australian
government budgeted an extra $16.4 million for AusAID to pay for fuel and
hospital bills and other projects for Nauru in 2001-02. Combined with the
existing AusAID budget of $3.4 million for Nauru, this extra allocation is not
sufficient to meet the amount of $30 million promised to the Nauru government.
This raises
questions about the sustainability of the so-called development initiatives in
Nauru:
-
Will
the necessary funds to meet the $30 million pledge be drawn from other AusAID
budget lines, with other South Pacific bilateral and regional programs cut back
to meet the Nauru commitments?
-
What
impact will this have on AusAID development priorities in the Pacific
(including good governance and poverty alleviation)?
-
Will
funding for Nauru continue at this increased level in 2002-3, or will the
country simply benefit from a one-off windfall, with no sustainability of
programs?
-
Will
one-off payments for Nauru (e.g. payment of hospital bills in Australia) divert
funds from AusAID’s long-term development priorities such as primary health
care and preventative health education?
Why place refugees in countries that have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention?
Nauru is
not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and
has no expertise in processing applications for asylum. Other Pacific countries
cited as possible locations for detention camps, such as Palau (16,000 people)
and Kiribati (70,000 people), have also not signed the Convention.
While Papua
New Guinea has signed the 1951 Refugee
Convention, it has placed on it significant reservations, and does not
accept Convention obligations covering: Wage-earning employment (Art.17);
Housing (Art.21); Public education (Art.22); Freedom of movement (Art.26);
Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge (Art.31); Expulsion (Art.32); and
Naturalisation (Art.34).
When will refugees leave the camps?
The
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between Australia, Papua New Guinea and Nauru
state that all persons entering under this arrangement will have left after six
months “or as short a time as is reasonably necessary”.
As at
January 2002, no country except Ireland has publicly pledged to take the
refugees for resettlement (and Ireland has only offered to take 50 of the more
than 1,550 people being processed in Nauru and Papua New Guinea). There will be
difficulty meeting the May 2002 deadline for all asylum seekers to leave Nauru,
especially as there are many refugees already waiting for resettlement in other
countries.
The
Australian government has successfully lobbied to extend the MOU for Manus
Island, Papua New Guinea until October 2002, to avoid a crisis that would fall
in the middle of an election campaign for the June 2002 Papua New Guinea
national elections. There are serious questions about what will happen next,
given that there are conflicting messages about the future of those assessed as
refugees, as well as those who do not gain refugee status. All applications for
the original 216 asylum seekers on Manus Island have been processed, but the
refugees are still awaiting notification of countries willing to take them for
resettlement. A further 230 refugees were relocated from Christmas Island to
Manus Island in late January 2002.
Why export the policy of mandatory detention?
The
Australian government has said that its Pacific program for asylum seekers is
developing the capacity of Pacific neighbours to address the refugee issue. But
most developed countries do not have mandatory detention for asylum seekers
(using a mix of short-term initial detention and release into the community
while applications are processed). UNHCR guidelines state: “The detention of
asylum-seekers is, in the view of UNHCR, inherently undesirable.”
Australia’s
bi-partisan policy of mandatory detention is being exported to the region,
distorting the policy and practice of countries like Nauru that have not even
signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. A
policy of mandatory detention is inappropriate in Australia, and it should
certainly not be exported to the region.
With
security and other tasks sub-contracted to private corporations, there are
concerns over accountability and transparency – a key issue in Australian
governance programs in the Pacific islands. Most of the processing of refugee
applications is being done in the Pacific by Australian immigration officials,
but not under Australian law. Asylum seekers are disadvantaged, as neither
Nauru nor Papua New Guinea have the full range of welfare and legal assistance
required for asylum seekers.
Has the refugee policy damaged Australia’s standing in the islands?
Nauru was
under Australian administration until 1968 and Papua New Guinea was an
Australian colony until 1975, so there are strong links between Australia and
these two Pacific nations.
While
government leaders from these countries have supported Australia’s refugee
policy in the Pacific, and many people have expressed humanitarian support for
the refugees and their plight, there has also been extensive regional criticism
of the Australian policy – from Prime Ministers and Presidents, the Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat, church leaders and non-government organisations. As
detailed in this report, the criticism has been sharp, with Australia accused
of being “big brother”, of “human trafficking,” of “dumping” people in the
Pacific, of breaching the “dignity” of small island states. There has been
significant political fallout, such as the sacking of the Papua New Guinea
Foreign Minister.
The focus
by the Australian government on the so-called “Pacific solution” is seen as
overshadowing other key priorities in the region. The Australian government is
actively promoting accountability, transparency, equity and sustainability as
key principles for governance in the Pacific, so the lack of transparency and
sustainability in the current program has sparked widespread anger. At a time
when other Australian policies (e.g. on climate change) are stretching
relations with island countries, the refugee crisis has further damaged
Australia’s image in the region.
Why
was there no regional co-ordination?
A major focus for Australia’s development assistance program in the Pacific region is the strengthening of regional multilateral agencies. Through AusAID’s Pacific regional program, the Australian government gives strong financial and political support to regional inter-governmental organisations, such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Yet the placement of the asylum seekers in the Pacific in late 2001 was conducted in an ad hoc way, involving no co-ordination and planning with key regional institutions.
The Australian government has recognised that tangible
progress on the intertwined issues of people smuggling, unauthorised migration
and refugees can only be achieved through international cooperation. The capacity to assist asylum seekers
and process their claims should be developed in a planned and orderly manner,
but hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent by Australia for a
relatively small number of refugees, without long term planning or
co-ordination. There should be regional consultation on refugee policy. Pacific
societies are willing to contribute what they can to address the global refugee
issue. However they would like to do this in a considered way, and not as part
of a policy driven by domestic political considerations in Australia.
What can be done?
Oxfam
Community Aid Abroad believes that the so-called “Pacific solution” is no
solution to the issues raised by the Tampa
crisis. It is important that Australia develop new policy on asylum seekers in
the Pacific region, based on humane and sustainable alternatives:
-
An end
to mandatory detention of asylum seekers in the Pacific islands;
-
Support
for Pacific Island governments to sign and ratify the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol and other relevant human rights instruments, and to
fully meet the relevant obligations;
-
Increased
support to address the situation of refugees and internally displaced people in
the Pacific islands in West Papua, Bougainville, Solomon Islands and other
countries;
-
An
increase in Australian development assistance to meet the UN target of 0.7 per
cent of GDP, with special programs targeted at peace-building in areas of
conflict, assistance to countries hosting millions of refugees (such as
Pakistan and Iran) and long-term sustainable development programs;
-
Detention
of asylum seekers only for short periods to allow health, security and identity
checks, followed by release into the community, with adequate funding for
services such as English language training, employment assistance and trauma
counselling; and
- Review of resettlement policies, with Australia to increase the numbers of refugees accepted each year.