Adrift in the Pacific

The Implications of Australia’s Pacific Refugee Solution


 

 

 

 

 

“For those who’ve come across the seas
We’ve boundless plains to share
With courage let us all combine
To advance Australia fair.’

The National Anthem Advance Australia Fair

 

 

 

Oxfam Community Aid Abroad

156 George Street,

Fitzroy, Victoria 3065

Australia

 

 

February 2002


Contents

Executive Summary........................................................................ 5

What is the cost of Australia’s refugee policy in the Pacific?............................................................. 5

Will funds for Nauru be taken from other AusAID programs in the Pacific?....................................... 5

Why place refugees in countries that have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention?.................... 6

When will refugees leave the camps?............................................................................................... 6

Why export the policy of mandatory detention?................................................................................. 6

Has the refugee policy damaged Australia’s standing in the islands?............................................... 6

Why was there no regional co-ordination?........................................................................................ 7

What can be done?........................................................................................................................... 7

PART ONE........................................................................................... 8

Detention of asylum seekers in the Pacific.......................................................... 8

Australian government policy................................................................................................................... 8

a.      Nauru....................................................................................................................................... 9

b.      Papua New Guinea................................................................................................................. 10

c.      Aotearoa/New Zealand........................................................................................................... 11

PART TWO......................................................................................... 12

Impact on Pacific development priorities.......................................................... 12

Total AusAID flows to Nauru 1990 – 2001....................................................................................... 13

PART THREE..................................................................................... 14

Issues arising from Australian program of detention in the Pacific.................. 14

a.      Humanitarian impact on asylum seekers................................................................................ 14

b.      Placement of asylum seekers in countries that are not party to 1951 Refugee Convention... 14

c.      Resettlement of people to third countries after gaining refugee status.................................. 15

d.      Introduction of mandatory detention programs into Pacific..................................................... 16

e.      Refugees and internally displaced people in the Pacific......................................................... 17

f.       Political fallout damages Australia’s image............................................................................. 18


APPENDIX ONE................................................................................. 20

Approaches to other Pacific countries............................................................... 20

Timor Lorosa’e................................................................................................................................ 20

Fiji     20

Kiribati............................................................................................................................................. 20

Palau                                                                                                                                                21

Tuvalu............................................................................................................................................. 21

APPENDIX TWO................................................................................. 22

Regional opposition to Australian policy on asylum seekers in the Pacific..... 22

Vanuatu Prime Minister................................................................................................................... 22

Forum Secretariat........................................................................................................................... 22

Fiji political, church and NGO leaders............................................................................................. 22

Nauru.............................................................................................................................................. 23

Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister sacked................................................................................... 24

Pacific Conference of Churches and Catholic Bishops Conference................................................ 24

Private sector.................................................................................................................................. 24

ENDNOTES........................................................................................ 25

 

 

 

 

 

156 George Street, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065

 


Executive Summary

At the beginning of the Tampa crisis in August 2001, the Australian government approached a number of neighbouring countries in the Pacific region to establish offshore detention centres – the so-called “Pacific Solution”.

Aotearoa/New Zealand, Nauru and Papua New Guinea agreed to take the Tampa refugees and others who arrived in Australian waters in subsequent weeks, and to establish detention camps to hold the asylum seekers while their applications for refugee status were processed. Other island countries including East Timor, Fiji, Palau and Kiribati were also approached to take asylum seekers, but have not done so.

There are over 1,550 people currently held in detention centres in the Pacific who were seeking refuge in Australia (1,118 asylum seekers are in detention on Nauru and a further 446 on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea as at 30 January 2002). A further 130 people have been declared as refugees, and have obtained residency in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

The costs of establishing and maintaining camps in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, and processing applications for refugee status are met by Australia. Application processing is being conducted by Australian officials in Papua New Guinea and by Australian officials and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) in Nauru.

Independent visitors to the camp in Nauru have noted the harsh physical conditions, and the trauma and uncertainty faced by the asylum seekers – conditions that have sparked protests, riots and acts of self-harm in detention camps in Australia.

What is the cost of Australia’s refugee policy in the Pacific?

The exact cost of sending asylum seekers to the Pacific has not been fully revealed, though media reports state that the Cabinet has been told it will cost up to $500 million dollars[1] to send asylum seekers to other Pacific nations.

Official government figures estimate the cost of setting up and running the detention centres in the Pacific at $96 million in 2001-02 ($72 million for the camps in Nauru, and $24 million for the detention centre in Papua New Guinea). The Royal Australian Navy has spent further millions on transporting the asylum seekers, and there are numerous other costs.

Nauru has been pledged a further $30 million for taking the asylum seekers which is being spent on a range of development programs and Papua New Guinea another $1 million. Some of these programs cannot be sustained (e.g. purchase of fuel and payment of hospital bills) and others (e.g. tertiary scholarships) will require funding beyond this year.

In the Australian aid budget for 2001-2, Nauru was scheduled to receive just $3.4 million through the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Therefore the pledge of $30 million to Nauru is a major shift in policy for the Australian government – the amount is greater than all AusAID funds provided to Nauru between 1993-2001. It is also more than 18 per cent of the total AusAID budget for the Pacific Islands (excluding Papua New Guinea), which is budgeted at $164.6 million in 2001-02.

Will funds for Nauru be taken from other AusAID programs in the Pacific?

The financial inducements offered to Nauru have distorted Australian development assistance priorities in the South Pacific, which are supposed to focus on poverty alleviation and governance programs.

In its Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook Statement 2001-2002, the Australian government budgeted an extra $16.4 million for AusAID to pay for fuel and hospital bills and other projects for Nauru in 2001-02. Combined with the existing AusAID budget of $3.4 million for Nauru, this extra allocation is not sufficient to meet the amount of $30 million promised to the Nauru government.

This raises questions about the sustainability of the so-called development initiatives in Nauru:

-          Will the necessary funds to meet the $30 million pledge be drawn from other AusAID budget lines, with other South Pacific bilateral and regional programs cut back to meet the Nauru commitments?

-          What impact will this have on AusAID development priorities in the Pacific (including good governance and poverty alleviation)?

-          Will funding for Nauru continue at this increased level in 2002-3, or will the country simply benefit from a one-off windfall, with no sustainability of programs?

-          Will one-off payments for Nauru (e.g. payment of hospital bills in Australia) divert funds from AusAID’s long-term development priorities such as primary health care and preventative health education?

Why place refugees in countries that have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention?

Nauru is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and has no expertise in processing applications for asylum. Other Pacific countries cited as possible locations for detention camps, such as Palau (16,000 people) and Kiribati (70,000 people), have also not signed the Convention.

While Papua New Guinea has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has placed on it significant reservations, and does not accept Convention obligations covering: Wage-earning employment (Art.17); Housing (Art.21); Public education (Art.22); Freedom of movement (Art.26); Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge (Art.31); Expulsion (Art.32); and Naturalisation (Art.34).

When will refugees leave the camps?

The Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between Australia, Papua New Guinea and Nauru state that all persons entering under this arrangement will have left after six months “or as short a time as is reasonably necessary”.

As at January 2002, no country except Ireland has publicly pledged to take the refugees for resettlement (and Ireland has only offered to take 50 of the more than 1,550 people being processed in Nauru and Papua New Guinea). There will be difficulty meeting the May 2002 deadline for all asylum seekers to leave Nauru, especially as there are many refugees already waiting for resettlement in other countries.

The Australian government has successfully lobbied to extend the MOU for Manus Island, Papua New Guinea until October 2002, to avoid a crisis that would fall in the middle of an election campaign for the June 2002 Papua New Guinea national elections. There are serious questions about what will happen next, given that there are conflicting messages about the future of those assessed as refugees, as well as those who do not gain refugee status. All applications for the original 216 asylum seekers on Manus Island have been processed, but the refugees are still awaiting notification of countries willing to take them for resettlement. A further 230 refugees were relocated from Christmas Island to Manus Island in late January 2002.

Why export the policy of mandatory detention?

The Australian government has said that its Pacific program for asylum seekers is developing the capacity of Pacific neighbours to address the refugee issue. But most developed countries do not have mandatory detention for asylum seekers (using a mix of short-term initial detention and release into the community while applications are processed). UNHCR guidelines state: “The detention of asylum-seekers is, in the view of UNHCR, inherently undesirable.”

Australia’s bi-partisan policy of mandatory detention is being exported to the region, distorting the policy and practice of countries like Nauru that have not even signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. A policy of mandatory detention is inappropriate in Australia, and it should certainly not be exported to the region.

With security and other tasks sub-contracted to private corporations, there are concerns over accountability and transparency – a key issue in Australian governance programs in the Pacific islands. Most of the processing of refugee applications is being done in the Pacific by Australian immigration officials, but not under Australian law. Asylum seekers are disadvantaged, as neither Nauru nor Papua New Guinea have the full range of welfare and legal assistance required for asylum seekers.

Has the refugee policy damaged Australia’s standing in the islands?

Nauru was under Australian administration until 1968 and Papua New Guinea was an Australian colony until 1975, so there are strong links between Australia and these two Pacific nations.

While government leaders from these countries have supported Australia’s refugee policy in the Pacific, and many people have expressed humanitarian support for the refugees and their plight, there has also been extensive regional criticism of the Australian policy – from Prime Ministers and Presidents, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, church leaders and non-government organisations. As detailed in this report, the criticism has been sharp, with Australia accused of being “big brother”, of “human trafficking,” of “dumping” people in the Pacific, of breaching the “dignity” of small island states. There has been significant political fallout, such as the sacking of the Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister.

The focus by the Australian government on the so-called “Pacific solution” is seen as overshadowing other key priorities in the region. The Australian government is actively promoting accountability, transparency, equity and sustainability as key principles for governance in the Pacific, so the lack of transparency and sustainability in the current program has sparked widespread anger. At a time when other Australian policies (e.g. on climate change) are stretching relations with island countries, the refugee crisis has further damaged Australia’s image in the region.

Why was there no regional co-ordination?

A major focus for Australia’s development assistance program in the Pacific region is the strengthening of regional multilateral agencies. Through AusAID’s Pacific regional program, the Australian government gives strong financial and political support to regional inter-governmental organisations, such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Yet the placement of the asylum seekers in the Pacific in late 2001 was conducted in an ad hoc way, involving no  co-ordination and planning with key regional institutions.

The Australian government has recognised that tangible progress on the intertwined issues of people smuggling, unauthorised migration and refugees can only be achieved through international cooperation. The capacity to assist asylum seekers and process their claims should be developed in a planned and orderly manner, but hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent by Australia for a relatively small number of refugees, without long term planning or co-ordination. There should be regional consultation on refugee policy. Pacific societies are willing to contribute what they can to address the global refugee issue. However they would like to do this in a considered way, and not as part of a policy driven by domestic political considerations in Australia.

What can be done?

Oxfam Community Aid Abroad believes that the so-called “Pacific solution” is no solution to the issues raised by the Tampa crisis. It is important that Australia develop new policy on asylum seekers in the Pacific region, based on humane and sustainable alternatives:

-          An end to mandatory detention of asylum seekers in the Pacific islands;

-          Support for Pacific Island governments to sign and ratify the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol and other relevant human rights instruments, and to fully meet the relevant obligations;

-          Increased support to address the situation of refugees and internally displaced people in the Pacific islands in West Papua, Bougainville, Solomon Islands and other countries;

-          An increase in Australian development assistance to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP, with special programs targeted at peace-building in areas of conflict, assistance to countries hosting millions of refugees (such as Pakistan and Iran) and long-term sustainable development programs;

-          Detention of asylum seekers only for short periods to allow health, security and identity checks, followed by release into the community, with adequate funding for services such as English language training, employment assistance and trauma counselling; and

-          Review of resettlement policies, with Australia to increase the numbers of refugees accepted each year.


PART ONE

Detention of asylum seekers in the Pacific

Australian government policy

In August 2001, a political and humanitarian crisis erupted in the lead up to the Australian national elections. SAS troops were sent aboard the Norwegian vessel MV Tampa to stop the captain sailing to Christmas Island with 433 asylum seekers rescued from the Indonesian boat Aceng. Rather than land the asylum seekers on Australian territory, the government sought out countries in the Pacific willing to establish detention camps to hold the asylum seekers and process their applications for refugee status.

As detailed below, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Nauru and Papua New Guinea agreed to take the Tampa refugees and others who arrived in Australian waters in subsequent weeks. At 30 January 2002, over 1,550 asylum seekers are located in detention camps in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, while another 130 have been accepted as refugees in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Other neighbouring island countries, including East Timor, Fiji, Palau and Kiribati, were also approached to take asylum seekers (for details, see Appendix One), but have not done so as of January 2002.

The Australian government has stressed that “the Government is firmly committed to ensuring the integrity of Australia’s borders and to the effective management and control of the movement of people to and from Australia…Underlying these commitments is the fact that Australia is a sovereign country which decides who can and who cannot enter and stay on its territory”.[2]

The Government has denied claims that it fuelled fears about asylum seekers to help win the November 2001 national election. Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock states: “The facts in relation to Tampa were that people who were safe and secure in Indonesia and wanted to leave Indonesia to come to Australia for essentially a better outcome were rescued at sea”.[3] Minister Ruddock has also suggested that some refugees were not coming to Australia for reasons of political or racial persecution, but because they have made a “lifestyle choice”.[4]

On 28 August 2001, Minister Ruddock told Parliament that new legislation was necessary because “generous interpretations” of Australia’s obligations under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees were “adding to perceptions that Australia is a soft touch”. The then Defence Minister, Peter Reith, also warned that unauthorised arrival of boats on Australian territory “can be a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a staging post for terrorist activities”.[5]

In September, the government introduced significant legislative changes to strengthen border control and the management of unauthorised arrivals.[6] Along with changes to Australian procedures and the excision of Ashmore, Carter, Cocos and Christmas Islands from Australia’s immigration boundaries (as “prescribed excised offshore places”), the new legislation also allows for people who arrive in an “excised offshore place” to be taken to a “declared country”.[7]

Thus, asylum seekers reaching Australian territory such as Ashmore Reef or Christmas Island can now be relocated to another “declared country”, to be held in an overseas detention camp while their application for refugee status is processed, rather than be sent to the Australian mainland. This is why over 1,550 asylum seekers are currently held in detention centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, even though they were seeking refuge in Australia.

The stated policy of the Australian government is to discourage further people smuggling, by relocating arriving asylum seekers to another country, rather than Australian territory. Another stated justification for the Australian policy is that it strengthens Pacific island capacity to process refugees and internally displaced people. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has argued: “One of the reasons the Papua New Guinea Government was happy for us to set up this ... processing centre is they have their own problems with illegal migrants and they didn't have anywhere to process them”.[8] 

However, the new policy of relocating asylum seekers arriving by boat to Pacific island countries - the so-called “Pacific solution” - was developed in a rapid and ad hoc manner, without support from regional bodies such as the Pacific Islands Forum. As detailed below (Appendix Two), there has been widespread criticism of the policy around the region, and significant political fallout (such as the sacking of the Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister and the suspension of the Presidential Counsel in Nauru, who both opposed aspects of the policy).

There is also concern that the financial inducements offered to Nauru have distorted Australian development assistance priorities in the South Pacific, which are supposed to focus on good governance and poverty alleviation.[9] As detailed below, nearly $100 million has been allocated for the establishment and running of camps in Papua New Guinea and Nauru in 2001-2. A further allocation of $30 million to Nauru for hosting the refugees is a major shift in policy, as the amount is greater than all AusAID funds provided to Nauru between 1993-2001. There are also significant costs for the Royal Australian Navy, which has been responsible for border patrol, even as Australian defence forces have been participating in conflicts in Afghanistan and the Gulf, and peacekeeping in Timor Lorosa’e (East Timor).

a.      Nauru

The placement of asylum seekers in Nauru is based on a Statement of Principles signed on 10 September 2001 by the President of Nauru, Rene Harris, and the then Minister for Defence of Australia, Peter Reith. The Nauru government saw the act “as a humanitarian gesture … to provide a temporary processing site for those people who were rescued at sea by the M.V. Tampa”, with the understanding that the refugees would be processed and out of the country by May 2002. 

The first detention camp on Nauru was established on 19 September 2001. The costs of establishing and maintaining the camps in Nauru and processing applications are being met by Australia. Processing the applications to determine people’s refugee status is being conducted by both UNHCR and Australian officials. The cost of setting up and running the camps in Nauru is estimated by the Australian government at $72 million for 2001-02.[10]

The original agreement with Nauru in September 2001 to establish a detention camp to process up to 800 asylum seekers was accompanied by a pledge to Nauru of $20 million for development activities. A subsequent Memorandum of Understanding, signed on 11 December, extended the number of asylum seekers to 1,200 people at any one time, and promised a further $10 million.

As at January 2002, there were a total of 1,118 asylum seekers in detention on Nauru[11], originally from Afghanistan (735), Iraq (335), Palestine (26), Iran (12), Sri Lanka (6) and Pakistan (4).

Nauru initially sought assistance from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)[12] for the assessment of protection claims and the identification and sourcing of recipient countries for the refugees. Normally the local government does this processing, but Nauru is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and has no expertise in processing applications for asylum.

The asylum seekers were originally to be housed in modern air-conditioned housing built for the games of the International Weightlifting Federation, but landowners refused to allow the property to be used, after requests for extra compensation were rejected. Two camps were then built: at the old sports ground and oval at Topside, and on the site of the old Presidential quarters. The Topside camp includes Afghan, Sri Lankan, Pakistani and Palestinian men, women and children disembarked from HMAS Manoora, while State House camp has Afghanis, Iranians and Iraqis disembarked from HMAS Tobruk.

IOM has responsibility for the management and administration of the two sites where the asylum seekers are housed. The Topside site was originally a bleak environment lacking water, sanitation or electricity. The asylum seekers are now housed in ‘blocks’, with a corrugated iron roof, sides of plastic sheeting and green nylon mesh. An independent visitor to the camp has noted: “Conditions are harsh, with the heat and humidity consistently in the upper thirties and health facilities are basic.”[13]

Catering is handled by a sub-contractor Eurest (a subsidiary of the Compass group of companies, based in Europe). Camp security is managed by another private company, Chubb Protection Services, based on a protocol signed by the Nauru Police Force, the IOM and the Australian Protective Service on 15 October 2001.

In addition to medical staff at the camp, the asylum seekers use Nauruan medical and dental facilities. Nauruan senior medical officer Dr. Kieran Keke notes: “Nauru is having to provide for the refugees in terms of health services which is stretching our limited health services…Simple things like supplying water to the camps means that Nauruan houses that have got water on order by truck isn’t being delivered water because the water truck is going to the camps first.”[14]

Nauru has a population of just 11,500 and a land area of only 21 square kilometres, much of which is uninhabitable due to phosphate mining, the major industry in the small island state.

The Nauru government is eager to source new funds because of cash flow problems due to declining revenues from the Nauru Phosphate Corporation, outstanding debts for Air Nauru and limits on mortgaging real estate investments overseas. As detailed below, Australia provides only a small amount of development aid to Nauru, and closed the Australian High Commission in Nauru in 1998.

Nauru relies on a monthly shipping service for food, fuel and other essentials, but in recent months has had delays because of non-payment of debts to the shipping company. Over the past year, Nauru has completely run out of essential commodities on several occasions including fresh fruit, flour, sugar, rice and the fuel and lubricating oil needed to operate the island’s power generators and desalination plant - the only source of fresh water for Nauruans and the asylum seekers.

The placement of more than a thousand asylum seekers, plus security guards, UN and IOM staff and other personnel is placing extra strain on an already difficult situation. Some materials for the camp have been flown in from Brisbane at great expense, rather than shipped in on the normal service.

b.     Papua New Guinea

On 11 October 2001, Australia and Papua New Guinea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a processing centre on Manus Island (to the north of the mainland). All costs of establishing and maintaining the camp and processing refugee applications are to be met by Australia. IOM has the responsibility for the management and administration of the camp. The cost of establishing and maintaining the detention camp on Manus Island in 2001-02 was estimated at $24 million for the first 216 asylum seekers, but this amount will increase as extra asylum seekers are relocated to the camp.[15]

The original agreement was to last for six months, and was for a limited numbers of refugees. However, the Australian government has sought to have the agreement extended to 12 months for up to 1,000 asylum seekers, leading to a political dispute and the sacking of the Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister (detailed below). After a delay of nearly three months, on 17 January 2002, the Papua New Guinea Cabinet agreed to increase the number to 1,000 asylum seekers at any one time on Manus Island. The Papua New Guinea Cabinet also approved an extension to the period of stay for the asylum seekers, from six to 12 months.[16]

The detention camp was established at Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island on 21 October 2001. This camp initially received 223 mainly Iraqi asylum-seekers (including 54 children) rescued at sea by HMAS Adelaide, flown in from Christmas Island. A further 230 people were flown to Manus Island from Christmas Island in late January 2002. As at 30 January 2002, 446 asylum seekers remain housed in the camp.

As Papua New Guinea is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the appropriate authorities to undertake refugee status determination processing in Papua New Guinea are the local authorities. However, processing the refugees on Manus Island is being conducted by Australian officials, because the UNHCR has refused to contribute to the processing on Manus Island, after expressing serious reservations about the ongoing Australian policy of sending asylum seekers to overseas countries.

Accommodation at the camp includes demountable houses and old Nissen huts previously used by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). Since last year, the camp has been expanded, with the relocation of 16 Papua New Guinea families to a new site and construction of facilities to cater for the married asylum seekers. This has freed up room for an additional 300 to 400 asylum seekers in the Nissen huts.

The Memorandum of Agreement between the Papua New Guinea and Australian governments includes the development of basic infrastructure including: the refurbishment of the Lombrum Base Hospital, with supply of X-ray machines and other medical equipment; grading and levelling of the road within Lombrum: a proper sanitation and sewerage system within the camp site; a water treatment plant; disposal of rubbish and waste; electric water pumps and purifiers; office space, transport and communication systems for the national liaison team, storage facilities; support back-up generators for a stable power supply; and settlement of outstanding water payments.[17]

Up to 60 casual staff have been hired on Manus Island, and a further 40 men and women from local villages work as security officers.[18]

The Manus Island Provincial government has arranged for sporting teams to visit the asylum seekers and for church groups to assist the detainees. Camp authorities have built a structure with a concrete floor, beams and a roof to serve as a mosque. As noted by Dr. Quentin Reilly, former Papua New Guinea Secretary of Health: “Manus Islanders are setting an example on how people escaping difficulties and persecution in their homeland should be treated…The people on Manus Island are not rich in monetary terms – the basic wage is equivalent to around 30 cents an hour. However their generosity in doing things to assist and spending their time with the refugees seems to outstrip the compassion and kindness shown by much ‘richer’ people in the country that sent them there.”[19]

Australia has provided $1 million to a trust fund established to meet costs associated with the Papua New Guinea Government’s role in setting up the processing centre. The fund “is jointly administered by the Australian High Commission and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will be replenished by Australia as required and jointly determined”.[20] As well as paying for the detention centre and processing costs, the Australian government also agreed to provide “technical and other assistance to assist them [Papua New Guinea] with their own illegal movement of people”. Media reports state: “the Papua New Guinea package could involve expert advice and equipment to help detect document fraud and sharing of intelligence of illegal movement through the Torres Strait”.[21]

Clause 9 of the MOU with Papua New Guinea also notes: “The site will be returned to the Government of Papua New Guinea, on conclusion of activities related to this MOU, in a condition that would enable similar use in the future, if required.”

c.      Aotearoa/New Zealand

In September 2001, Aotearoa/New Zealand assisted Australia with the initial Tampa crisis by agreeing to take 150 of the 433 asylum seekers transferred from the MV Tampa to HMAS Manoora, with preference going to families. Eventually 131 asylum seekers, mainly Shiite Hazaris from Afghanistan, were flown